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DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY FOR
INCOME TAX PURPOSES
The corporate entity concept regards any corporation as a legal
entity entirely distinct from those who own and control it.1 When
the corporation really came of age sometime around the turn of the
eighteenth century,2 the legal entity concept as applied to corpora-
tions reached its zenith. 3 This legal fiction not only expressed the
classical theories of corporate function, but has played a great role
in corporate development.4 However, this concept is not nearly so
effective today as a tool for legal decision. Although the corporate
entity concept received early judicial acceptance in the famous Dart-
mouth College case,5 for tax purposes the modem corporation has been
viewed by courts and legislature as a special kind of legal entity. It
has been necessary, due to our increasingly complicated tax structure,
to "disregard the corporate entity in an increasing number of cases." 6
The corporate entity concept, however, is generally very useful to
business activity.7 And unless to do so would be very inequitable and
unjust under the particular circumstances, the separate entity of the
corporation will be recognized by the legislature and courts even in
modern tax cases.8 In income tax situations, statutes and judicial
opinions have generally upheld the corporate entity concept.9 Whether
1 10A Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation 234 (1948).
2 H. Ke Chin Wang, 58 Law Q. Rev. 498 (1942).
3 Tillman, "Taxation and the Corporate Entity: A Case History," 4 Loyola
L. Rev. 1 (1947).
4 Id. at 1.
5 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 686 (1819). The
Supreme Court pointed out that a corporation exists only by virtue of law and
that the corporation as a legal personality is capable of acting in many repects as
a single individual-possessing the particular powers conferred upon it by its
charter.
6 Supra note 3, at 1.
7 Such is the case "whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the
law of the State of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of
creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience. ..
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
81 Prentice-Hall, Corporation Service 1120, 1121 (1957).
9 The following situations have been listed as situations where the doctrine
of corporate entity has been repeatedly affirmed: (1) transfers between corpora-
tion and stockholder; (2) determination of gain or loss arising from a sale or ex-
change; (3) liquidating dividends; (4) considering whether payments by employer
to employee are gifts or compensation; (5) waivers; (6) capital net gain pro-
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it be the legislature or the courts acting, the corporate entity will be
respected unless special circumstances exist which are considered to
demand the contrary.10
Recognizing the separate entity of a corporation in tax cases will
be to the taxpayer's advantage in some cases, but will produce greater
revenue for the government in others."' Thus, it seems pertinent to
note whether it is the government or the individual, who in a given
case seeks to disregard the corporate entity. Also, since the corporate
entity is generally recognized, an overall picture of the corporate en-
tity concept under federal income taxation can most easily be achieved
by an analysis of the situation where the tax laws and the courts have
disregarded the concept.
Statutory Disregard of the Corporate Entity
To prevent injustice Congress has frequently provided special relief
to the government as well as to individual taxpayers by specifically
providing for disregard of the separate corporate entity in many
situations where the courts had upheld, or were expected to uphold,
such separate corporate existence.' 2 The constitutional power of Con-
gress to do so seems unquestioned. 3
Other than in the special situations just referred to, the 1954 Inter-
nal Revenue Code contains surprisingly few provisions purporting to
define instances when a corporation will or will not be regarded as a
separate entity for tax purposes.14 The general provision of the Code
dealing with taxation of corporations is Section 11. The Supreme
Court has rejected the argument that this provision demands that a
tax be levied upon the income of every corporation whatever the nat-
ure of its activity or ownership of its stock and, that the regard or dis-
regard of the corporate entity should be determined accordingly.15
The instances of disregard of the corporate entity in the Code may
largely be determined by focusing attention on specific provisions and
vision; (7) provision for taxation of United States citizens in Philippine Islands;S8) consolidated returns provision; (9) amortization provisions; (10) worthless
ebt provision; (11) business expense provision; (12) interest or refunds pro-
vision; (13) net loss provision; (14) stock loss provisions of the 1932 Act; and
(15) credit for taxes provision of 1921 Act. 10A Mertens, Law of Federal Income
Taxation 243 (1948).
10 Case, "Disregard of Corporate Entity in Federal Taxation-The Modem
Approach," 30 Va. L. Rev. 398 (1944).
"rI Prentice-Hall, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1121.
12 Case, supra note 10, at 403.
13 Case, supra note 10, at 401.
14 Case, supra note 10, at 398.
15 Such a contention was made in the Government's brief, but was rejected
by the Court. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
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noting the direct or indirect effect they have upon the corporate en-
tity concept.
Several Code provisions directly or indirectly disregard the cor-
porate entity concept. For instance, in certain situations the stock-
holders are taxed on gain or income realized by corporations. 16 Sec-
tions 336 and 337 of the Code provide that if the terms of the statutes
are met, the corporation will not be taxed on proceeds derived from
liquidations. 17 Also, the Code provides, in effect, for disregard of the
corporate entity for tax purposes in certain situations where corpora-
tions are the subject of reorganization.'s Section 53219 provides for
penalty taxation on corporations that have accumulated surpluses for
the purpose of "avoiding the income tax with respect to its share-
holders or the shareholders of any other corporation." Such a pro-
vision tends to pierce the corporate veil and look through form to
substance in order to protect federal revenues. Section 150120 allows
certain affiliated corporations2' the privilege of making consolidated
income and excess profit tax returns for a taxable year instead of
separate returns if the corporations so elect, thus, in a sense disregard-
ing the separate legal entity of certain related corporations. And
Section 36922 of the 1954 Code disregards the separate corporate en-
tity of a corporation whose control is acquired by a person, persons, or
another corporation for the principal purpose of evading or avoiding
income taxes, by denying the income benefit otherwise derived from
such acquisition. Also, the Code 23 will not allow certain stockholders,
including those owning more than fifty per cent of the outstanding
stock of a corporation, a deduction for losses arising from sales and
16 Sees. 312(h) and 551 of 1954 Int. Rev. Code. See sees. 394 and 337 of
1939 Int. Rev. Code; Revenue Act of 1934, see. 115(e), P.L. No. 216, 73d Cong.,
1st sess. (1934); Revenue Act of 1932, see. 115(e), 47 Stat. 204, 26 U.S.C.A.,
sec. 3115 (1932); Revenue Act of 1921, see. 218, 42 Stat. 245 (1921); and Reve-
nue Act of 1918, sec. 218(e), 40 Stat. 1070 (1919).
17 Since such proceeds are merely the current value of the assets that went
into the formation of the corporation, and they are derived now in transactions
designed to terminate either completely or partially the legal existence of the
corporation, they are not taxed to the corporation. This provision has the effect,
then, of looking through the separate identity of the corporation.
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sees. 354, 355 and 361; Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
sec. 112.
19 See sec. 102(a) of 1939 Int. Rev. Code; Revenue Act of 1934, sec. 102,
P.L. No. 216, 73d Cong., 1st sess. (1934).
20 See sec. 141 of 1939 Int. Rev. Code; Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 141, 45
Stat. 831, 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 2141 (1928); Revenue Act of 1926, sec. 240, 44 Stat.
46, 26 U.S.C.A., see. 993 (1926); and Revenue Act of 1918, sec. 240, 40 Stat.
1081 (1919).
21 Defined in sec. 1504 of 1954 Int. Rev. Code.
22 See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, see. 129.
23 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec. 267. And see sec. 24(b) of 1939 Int. Rev.
Code; Revenue Act of 1934, sec. 24(a) (6), P.L. No. 216, 73d Cong., 1st sess.
(1934).
[Vol. 47,
exchanges of property between the individual and the corporation.
Lastly, under Section 34124 of the 1954 Code, the separate existence of a
collapsible corporation is disregarded by treating certain corporate
transactions as taxable gain to the shareholders.
Judicial Treatment of the Corporate Entity
Where Congress has left open the question of regard or disregard
of the corporate entity, the courts have often been called upon by
litigants to disregard the concept in order to attach the corporation's
income to certain persons or to allow them to deduct a corporate loss
from their own income. Although Congress has not ignored the separ-
ate existence of a corporation for tax purposes, in a great number of
situations, court decisions doing so are legion.2 5 The courts have found
it a difficult task to lay down uniform rules as to when the corporate
entity will be disregarded, a difficulty partly explainable by the maze
of varying factual situations surrounding corporate existence. Like-
wise, it is very difficult to extract a uniform rule out of the courts
inconsistent theories as to when the corporate entity concept will be
ignored.20 However, by inquiring in each case into the purpose for
which the corporation was formed, it may then be possible to formulate
something like a consistent rationalization of most of the cases. But
even then, it is necessary to divide the cases into those in which dis-
regard of the corporate entity is sought by the government for the
collection of taxes, and those in which the individual or corporate
taxpayer seeks disregard in order to avoid the payment of certain taxes.
The vast majority of cases where courts have disregarded the cor-
porate entity have been those in which the disregard was sought by the
government.27 Some authorities attribute this result to an underlying
tendency on the part of courts to disregard the corporate entity only
when the collection of additional revenue will thereby be served.28
It is not believed that the cases completely justify such a conclusion,
although the courts, certainly, are unwilling to perpetuate a policy
of disregarding an established concept to the detriment of government
revenue in the absence of unusual circumstances.
24 See sec. 117(m) of 1939 Int. Rev. Code.
25 Case, "Disregard of Corporate Entity in Federal Taxation-The Modem
Approach," 30 Va. L. Rev. 414 (1944); and see Meldman, "Corporations, Entity
Theory, Taxation," 7 Wis. L. Rev. 252 (1932).
26 Case, op. cit. supra at 407 and 408.
27 43 Colum. L Rev. 234, 235 (1943).
2 8 Case, "Disregard of Corporate Entity in Federal Taxation-The Modem
Approach," 30 Va. L. Rev. 414 (1944); and see Stickells, "Corporate Entity and
Taxation," 29 B.U.L. 486, 501 and 508 (1949).
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In Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,29 the Supreme Court
refused to accept the Government's contention that the courts may
never disregard the corporate entity at the taxpayer's request. The
Court cited cases where the proposition that the corporate entity
could only be rejected for the collection of additional taxes had, in
effect, been discounted. Although the Court refused to accept a rule
as to disregarding corporate entity based upon when additional reve-
nues would result, in actual application the results of the cases have
not been too inconsistent with such a proposition. However, in view
of the fact that the Supreme Court in the Moline Properties case would
not accept the Government's theory, it is believed that some more
appropriate rule should be found, and that a more sound rule can be
evolved from the cases.
At government insistence, courts have disregarded the corporate en-
tity in cases involving corporate reorganization, 30 subsidiary corpora-
tions,31 wholly-owned or controlled corporations,32 and situations
where one corporation leases property to another with the rent pay-
able directly to the stockholders of the lessor.33 Generally, special cir-
cumstances34 must be shown in all these cases to justify the court's
making an exception in tax cases to the general rule that corporations
are distinct entities. These special circumstances have been found in
cases where the recognition of the entity would contravene directly
or indirectly an act of Congress, 35 where the sole purpose of forming
the corporation (or its sole use) was to avoid taxes,3 6 and where the
29 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
30Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering,
302 U.S. 609 (1938); but see other cases referred to in Finkelstein, "The Cor-
porate Entity and the Income Tax," 44 Yale L. J. 439 and 440 (1935).
31 Mehrlust v. Higgins, 112 F. 2d 717 (C.C.A. 2d 1940); cf. Burnett v. Com-
monwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932); but see Finkelstein, supra
note 30.
32 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1934); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S.
473 (1939); Griffiths v. Helverng 308 U.S. 355 (1939); C.I.R. v. Court Holding
Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1944); Bazley v. C.I.R., 331 U.S. 737 (1947); C.I.R. v. Sun-
nen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). Tis situation is partly controlled by statute today,
see note 22.3 3 American Telegraph and Cable Co. v. United States, 61 Ct. CL. 326 (1925),
cert. denied 271 U.S. 660 (1926); Rensselaer and Saratoga Br. v. Irwin, 249 F.
726 (C.C.A. 2d 1918); and see Finkelstein, "The Corporate Entity and the Income
Tax," 44 Yale L. J. 441 and 442 (1935).
34 1 Prentice-Hall, Corporate Service 1123 (1957).35 In Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the Court pointed out that
the statute involved would indirectly be given an improper interpretation if the
corporate entity were upheld. Similarly, see Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473
(1939).
36 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Griffiths v. Helvering 408
U.S. 355 (1940). In National Investors Corporation v. Hoey, 144 F. 2a 466
(C.C.A. 2d 1944), the Court admitted that Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 619 U.S. 436 (1943), had been interpreted to contradict the doctrine that
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corporation was not created to serve a useful business purpose.3 7
As previously concluded, courts seem much more hesitant to dis-
regard the corporate entity at the insistence of a corporate or indi-
vidual taxpayer. The power of one to deny the corporate entity is
very limited if he in fact set up the corporation or directly benefits
from its existence. 38 A few cases tending to make an exception to this
rule have been expressly overruled 9 by subsequent decisions or pos-
sibly such cases may be distinguished on their particular facts so as
to lay down no general rule.40 Others have reached their results solely
in order to preserve statutory or public policy.41 There are a few
the motive to avoid taxation is never relevant as to whether a court will disregard
the corporate entity. The circuit court pointed out that the Moline Properties case:
merely declares that to be a separate jural person for purpose of
taxation, a corporation must engage in some industrial, commercial, or
other activitybesides avoiding taxation: in other words, that the term
'corporation' will be interpreted to mean a corporation which does
some 'business' in the ordinary meaning; and that escaping taxation
is not 'business' in the ordinary meaning."
Thus, the factor of whether a corporation was formed merely in order to avoid
taxation is still believed to be an important consideration in determining whether
a court will disregard the corporate entity, even after the Moline Properties case
which talked merely in terms of "business" or "non-business" purposes. It is not
believed that National Carbide Corporation v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949),
in any way changes the above rationalization, but, rather, goes along with it. This
rationalization is also supported by a great number of Federal District and Circuit
Court cases which preserve the test of whether a corporation is attempting to avoid
taxes in determining if the corporate entity should be preserved. It is believed
that the Moline Properties case, as well as the National Carbide case, are in accord
with Federal District and Circuit Court cases in their rationalizations as to when
the corporate veil will be lifted. And see Case, "Disregard of Corporate Entity
in Federal Taxation-The Modem Approach," 30 Va. L. Rev. 420 and 432, note
112 (1944).
37National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Burnett v. Commonwealth
Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935). For a list of factors which courts have used in determining whether a
corporation is "doing business," see Case, supra note 36 at 426. Generally, see
I Prentice-Hall, Corporation Service 1120, note 1 (1957).
3843 Colum. L. Rev. 234 and 235 (1943); Kotte, "Corporations-Corporate
Entity Recognized for Purpose of Taxation," 30 Geo. L. J. 91 (1944).
39If any rule could possibly be derived from Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe,
247 U.S. 330 (1918), and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U.S. 71 (1918), as to
disregard of the corporate entity, it seems to have been effectively overruled by
National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 432 (1949); Burnett v.
Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932), and Moline Properties,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).4 OSouthern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 338-339 (1918); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U.S. 71 (1918). That these two cases lay down no general
rule of law, but are distinguishable on their particular factual situations, see
National Carbide Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 432 (1949); Moline Properties,
Inc., v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Burnett v. Commonwealth Improve-
ment Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932); Case, "Disregard of Corporate Entity in Federal
Taxation-The Modem Approach," 30 Va. L. Rev. 409 (1944).41 A parent with strict control over its subsidiary may be allowed to deny the
corporate entity for tax purposes where the subsidiary was created solely to over-
come the parent's disability to hold and convey legal title to land. 112 W. 59 St.
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reorganization cases that seem to be outside these categories. For in-
stance, in Weiss v. Steam, 42 the Supreme Court said that the trans-
action creating a new corporation amounted to a financial reorganiza-
tion under which each stockholder retained half his interest and dis-
posed of the remainder. In this situation, the new stock merely did
not come within the statutory definition of income. Although this
result was sought by the taxpayer, the result was not based, it is be-
lieved, on a disregard of corporate entity at judicial discretion, but
rather, on the statute defining taxable income. A similar result was
reached in Eisner v. Macomber,43 on the same basis.
There are some federal cases that go very far in allowing a tax-
payer to take advantage of the corporate entity for some purposes and
disregard it for purposes of taxation in other instances. In Industrial
Cotton Mills v. Commissioner,44 the court said:
It is true that ordinarily the loss sustained by one of a number of
affiliated corporations cannot be carried forward and deducted from
the consolidated return, but must be deducted only from the income
of the corporation which has sustained the loss....
But the rule has no application, we think, where there is in reality
but one taxpayer, and the merger, as here, is with a mere holding
company which owns no property except the stock and obligations of
the company which produces the entire income. In such case the law
should look through form to substance and treat the income in law,
as it is in fact, as the income of the corporation which has sustained
the loss.
A similar result was reached in a few other federal cases, 45 but a dif-
ferent view was taken in others.46 The Supreme Court has expressly
Corp. v. Helvering, 68 F. 2d 397 (App. D.C. 1933); Law v. McLaughlin, 2 F.
Supp. 601 (N.D. Cal. 1933). And a taxpaying corporation was allowed to deny
its separate existence for tax purposes in order to meet a great emergency threat-
ening the very existence of the parent. The parent had clean hands, and its pre-
servation was important to the public. North Jersey Title Ins. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 84 F. 2d 898 (3rd Cir. 1936). These cases are merely unusual situations
laying down no rules to be followed in the general case where a taxpayer seeks
disregard of the corporate entity. Likewise, see the following cases: Inland De-
velopment Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 986 (10th Cir. 1941); Consolidated
Goal Co. v. Nat'l. B. Coal Commissioner, 103 F. 2d 124 (7th Cir. 1939); MunsonS.8. Line v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 849 (2d Cir. 1935); Olds v. Commissioner,
75 F. 2d 272 (2d Cir. 1935). Contra: Keystone Mining Co. v. Cray, 120 F. 2d 1(3d Cir. 1941); c.s American Package Corp. v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d 413
(4th Cir. 1942).42 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
4252US. 189 (1920).
44 61 F. 2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1932).
4Pi Pole and Shaft Co. v. Commissioner, 55 F. 2d 861 (6th Cir. 1932);
H. . Miller Industries Co. v. Commissioner, 61 F. 2d 412 (6th Cir. 1932); and
Appeal of H. E. Brubaker, 4 B.T.A. 1171.
46 Athol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 54 F. 2d 230 (1st Cir. 1931); Turner-
Farber-Love Co. v. Helvering, 68 F. 2d 416 (App. D. C. 1933).
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overruled a result like that in Industrial Cotton MillsYt and by im-
plication in other cases4 8 so as to effectively overrule the result of the
former federal cases.
Thus, the previous rationalization of the cases where courts have
disregarded the corporate entity in behalf of the Government may still
be retained in cases where the taxpayer seeks disregard of the cor-
porate entity, if one equitable rule is added: that the corporate entity
cannot be recognized for one purpose and disregarded for another.
49
In other words:
The organizer of a corporation . . .will not be afforded the excep-
tional remedy [disregard of the corporate entity] where he affirms
the existence of the subsidiary for some tax purposes and denies it
for others, or where the subsidiary was set up to shield property from
creditors or otherwise put third persons at a disadvantage, or where
he invokes the benefits of a statute without bringing himself clearly
within the limitations set by it.5°
The same principle applies to any person who derives benefits from
the separate existence of a corporation and who seeks to deny the
separate entity of the corporation for tax purposes.
Conclusion
Thus, the corporate entity is disregarded for tax purposes where
statutes so provide and in certain other situations by judicial decision.
These situations exist where the recognition of the entity would con-
travene directly or indirectly an act of Congress, where the sole pur-
pose of forming the corporation (or its sole use) was to avoid taxes,
and where the corporation was not created to serve a useful business
purpose. And, where a taxpayer seeks disregard of the corporate en-
tity, the courts seem to feel that the utilization of legal benefits flowing




7 New Colonial Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
4 8 National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Burnett v. Common-
wealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932).
49 Burnett v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932), seems
to lay down this general principle. And see Case, "Disregard of Corporate Entity
in Federal Taxation-The Modem Approach," 30 Va. L. Rev. 425 (1944); Kotte,
"Corporations-Corporate Entity Recognized for Purposes of Taxation," 30 Geo.
L. J.91 (1944).
.0 43 Colum. L. Rev. 235 (1943).
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